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YOU HAVE THE RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT, BUT ANYTHING
YOU DON’T SAY MAY BE USED AGAINST YOU:
THE ADMISSIBILITY OF SILENCE AS EVIDENCE AFTER
SALINAS v. TEXAS
Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013)
Adam M. Hapner*
In Salinas v. Texas, the United States Supreme Court held that a
suspect’s refusal to answer an officer’s questions during a noncustodial,
pre-Miranda, criminal interrogation is admissible at trial as substantive
evidence of guilt.1 In a plurality decision, Justice Samuel Alito
emphasized that before a suspect can rely on the privilege against selfincrimination, the suspect must invoke the privilege.2 Consequently,
because silence does not invoke the privilege,3 and because the
petitioner failed to expressly invoke the privilege in words, the
prosecutor’s use of his pre-Miranda silence during a noncustodial
interrogation did not violate the Fifth Amendment.4
The Salinas decision is important because it gives insight into the
extent that the constitutional right to remain silent truly protects citizens
while speaking—or refusing to speak—to law enforcement.5
Furthermore, the decision created new rules governing the admissibility
of silence evidence that may have a significant effect at trial and at
sentencing.6 After explaining the Salinas decision in more detail, this

* J.D., 2014, University of Florida Levin College of Law. Thank you to the current
members, staff, and faculty advisor of the Florida Law Review for your support. Thanks also to
Professor John Stinneford for your advice and encouragement.
1. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2177–78 (2013) (holding that the use at trial of
the petitioner’s silence to suggest “that he was guilty” was constitutional because the petitioner
did not invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination).
2. Id. at 2178.
3. Id.; see also Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010).
4. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
5. See Christopher Totten, Salinas v. Texas: Guilt by Silence and the Disappearing Fifth
Amendment Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 49 CRIM. L. BULL. 1501, 1501 (2013)
(describing Salinas both as a continuation the Court’s “long-standing trend” of limiting Miranda
protections and as “a more frontal attack on the Fifth Amendment right . . . against selfincrimination”); Adam Liptak, A 5-4 Ruling, One of Three, Limits Silence’s Protection, N.Y.
TIMES (June 17, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/18/us/supreme-court-hands-downthree-decisions-that-are-5-to-4.html (stating that Salinas “limited a criminal suspect’s right to
remain silent before being taken into custody”).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 69–74; Totten, supra note 5, at 1501 (“By
permitting defendants’ silence in response to noncustodial police interrogation to be used
against them as evidence of their guilt at trial, the [Salinas] judgment unjustifiably exposes
defendants to the risk of wrongful conviction.”); cf. Mitchell v. United States, 526 U.S. 314, 329
(1999) (noting the high stakes associated with negative inferences at criminal trials and during
1763
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Comment briefly discusses the Supreme Court’s development of rules
governing the evidentiary admissibility of silence that occurs during
questioning by law enforcement.7 Then, this Comment addresses how
Salinas has changed that framework. Finally, this Comment explains
how Salinas implied the “right” answer to the only question regarding
the admissibility of silence evidence that remains today.
In Salinas, local police were investigating a double homicide when
they visited the petitioner at his home in Houston, Texas.8 The
petitioner agreed to accompany the police to the station for questioning,
and also voluntarily handed over his shotgun for ballistics testing.9 For
most of the approximately hour-long, noncustodial interview that
followed, the petitioner answered the police officer’s questions.10 “But
when asked whether his shotgun ‘would match the shells recovered at
the scene of the murder,’ the petitioner declined to answer.”11
After receiving additional evidence from a witness who claimed to
hear the petitioner confess to the killings, prosecutors charged the
petitioner with committing both murders.12 During the murder trial, the
prosecutor used the petitioner’s refusal to answer the officer’s question
as evidence of his guilt.13 For example, the “prosecutor told the jury,
among other things, that ‘[a]n innocent person’ would have said, ‘What
are you talking about? I didn’t do that. I wasn’t there.’”14 The petitioner
was subsequently found guilty of murder and sentenced to twenty years
in prison.15 The Court of Appeals of Texas upheld the petitioner’s
conviction and rejected his argument that the prosecutor’s use of his
silence violated the Fifth Amendment, “reasoning that the petitioner’s
pre-arrest, pre-Miranda silence was not ‘compelled’ within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment.”16
The Supreme Court “granted certiorari to resolve a division of
authority” in the federal circuit courts.17 Specifically, it framed the issue
sentencing, and that “the inference drawn by the District Court from petitioner’s silence may
have resulted in decades of added imprisonment”).
7. This Comment does not address silence occurring at trial (i.e., when the defendant
refuses to testify), or the merits of any of the Supreme Court’s decisions that are discussed.
8. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178.
9. Id.
10. Id. Importantly, both the petitioner and the prosecutor agreed that the petitioner was
not in custody or given Miranda warnings at any time during the questioning. Id.
11. Id. (citation omitted).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (quoting Salinas v. State,
368 S.W.3d 550, 556 (Tex. App. 2011)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
15. Id. at 2178 (majority opinion); id. at 2185 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 2178 (majority opinion) (citing Salinas, S.W.3d at 557–59). The Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals affirmed on the same ground. Id. at 2179 (citing Salinas v. State, 369 S.W.3d
176, 179 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012)).
17. Id. at 2179 (citation omitted).
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in the case as “whether the prosecution may use a defendant’s assertion
of the privilege against self-incrimination during a noncustodial police
interview as part of its case in chief.”18 The Court declined to answer
that question, however, because the petitioner did not assert his
privilege.19
The privilege against self-incrimination comes from the Fifth
Amendment’s declaration that “[n]o person . . . shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself.”20 This privilege
permits an individual not only to refuse to testify against himself in a
criminal trial, but also to refuse to answer an official’s questions “where
the answers might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings.”21 In
other words, the Fifth Amendment creates a “right to remain silent”
both at trial and during interrogation by law enforcement.22
As Salinas emphasized, however, the privilege against selfincrimination is not self-executing.23 To claim its protection, a witness
must unambiguously invoke the privilege, absent exceptional
circumstances.24 For example, in Berghuis v. Thompkins, the Court
previously held that the defendant’s silence for two hours and forty-five
minutes during a warned custodial interrogation by law enforcement
was insufficient to invoke his right to remain silent,25 and that he
implicitly waived his right when he knowingly and voluntarily made
statements to the police thereafter.26 Although the practical effect of
Berghuis is highly controversial,27 and the decision dealt more with the
18. Id. (emphasis added).
19. See id. (“But because petitioner did not invoke the privilege during his interview, we
find it unnecessary to reach that question.”).
20. U.S. CONST. amend. V. See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 458–61
(1966) (exploring the contours of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination in
the context of in-custody interrogation).
21. Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 426 (1984) (quoting Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414
U.S. 70, 77 (1973)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
22. See id. at 430; Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467 (“[T]here can be no doubt that the Fifth
Amendment privilege is available outside of criminal court proceedings and serves to protect
persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is curtailed in any significant way from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.”).
23. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2178; accord Murphy, 465 U.S. at 434 (noting the general rule
that the Fifth Amendment privilege is not self-executing).
24. Berghuis v. Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259–60 (2010) (“A requirement of an
unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that ‘avoid[s]
difficulties of proof and . . . provide[s] guidance to officers’ on how to proceed in the face of
ambiguity.” (alterations in original) (quoting Davis v. United States, 512 U.S. 452, 458–59
(1994))); see Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2183 (finding unpersuasive the petitioner’s argument that the
“express invocation requirement” is unworkable where a witness is silent).
25. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2258–60.
26. Id. at 2262–63.
27. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2189–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted) (arguing
that “most[] Americans are aware that they have a constitutional right not to incriminate
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admissibility of statements made after silence, it nonetheless shows that
silence itself does not invoke the protection of the Fifth Amendment.28
Nevertheless, the Court has made it clear that a person is not
required to invoke the privilege to claim the protection of the Fifth
Amendment where the person faces unwarned custodial interrogation.29
In the groundbreaking case of Miranda v. Arizona, the Court concluded
that the “process of in-custody interrogation” of suspects contains
“inherently compelling pressures” that potentially undermine a
suspect’s opportunity to exercise the privilege against selfincrimination.30 As a result, to protect Fifth Amendment interests, the
Court mandated that all persons subjected to custodial interrogation be
immediately given Miranda warnings, informing them of their right to
remain silent and that anything they say may be used against them,
among other things.31 If Miranda warnings are not given to a suspect in
custody, the suspect is not required to unambiguously invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination during interrogation in order to
assert the protection of the Fifth Amendment.32 Thus, after Miranda,
the issue of whether silence occurred post-custody33 is significant to
themselves by answering questions posed by the police during an interrogation” but are likely
not aware of the “technical legal requirements” to invoke the right); Steven I. Friedland, PostMiranda Silence in the Wired Era: Reconstructing Real Time Silence in the Face of Police
Questioning, 80 MISS. L.J. 1339, 1344 (2011); Stephen Rushin, Rethinking Miranda: The PostArrest Right to Silence, 99 CALIF. L. REV. 151, 158 (2011) (arguing that while simple to apply,
the Berghuis default rule may “fundamentally undermine the protections offered by Miranda”);
Jonathan Witmer-Rich, Interrogation and the Roberts Court, 63 FLA. L. REV. 1189, 1194, 1202–
09 (2011) (arguing, inter alia, that Berghuis “effectively eliminated” the waiver requirement,
altering the protections afforded by Miranda); cf. Janet Ainsworth, ‘You Have the Right to
Remain Silent . . .’ But Only if You Ask for It Just So, 15 INT’L. J. SPEECH, LANGUAGE & L. 1, 19
(2008) (arguing that Miranda “rights are perilously easy to waive and nearly impossible to
actually invoke”).
28. Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2259–60; accord Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182.
29. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (stating that custodial interrogation is a situation
“where governmental coercion makes his forfeiture of the privilege involuntary”); Minnesota v.
Murphy, 465 U.S. 420, 429–30 (1984) (noting that an exception to the general rule requiring
suspects to assert the privilege may exist where “some identifiable factor” limits the suspect’s
ability to freely admit, deny, or refuse to answer).
30. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
31. Id. at 467–74; accord Berghuis, 130 S. Ct. at 2259; Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (“Due
to the uniquely coercive nature of custodial interrogation, a suspect in custody cannot be said to
have voluntarily forgone the privilege ‘unless [he] fails to claim [it] after being suitably
warned.’” (alterations in original) (quoting Murphy, 465 U.S. at 430)).
32. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180 (noting that the Court has held that “a witness’ failure
to invoke the privilege must be excused where governmental coercion makes his forfeiture of the
privilege involuntary,” and that, under Miranda, a suspect who is subjected to the pressures of
unwarned custodial interrogation “need not invoke the privilege” to claim the protection of the
Fifth Amendment (emphasis added)).
33. For purposes of this Comment, “post-custody silence” is defined as silence that occurs
while the suspect was “deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way” (i.e., while “in
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determining the admissibility of silence evidence under the Fifth
Amendment.34 In fact, placing a suspect into custody may now be
viewed as the “triggering mechanism” for the protection of the Fifth
Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.35
Furthermore, after Miranda, the issue of whether the silence
occurred before or after Miranda warnings is also significant to
determining the admissibility of silence evidence. In footnote thirtyseven of the opinion, the Court stated that once the police give Miranda
warnings to a suspect who is in custody, “[t]he prosecution may
not . . . use at trial the fact that he stood mute or claimed his privilege in
the face of accusation.”36 This dictum proved true in the following
Supreme Court cases that addressed the admissibility of silence
evidence. Indeed, in all of these cases, the dispositive factor was
whether Miranda warnings were given before the defendants’ silence.
For example, in Doyle v. Ohio, the Court granted certiorari to decide
whether the impeachment use of a defendant’s post-arrest, postMiranda silence violated any provision of the federal Constitution.37 In
Doyle, two defendants were arrested and tried separately for selling
marijuana.38 Before trial, the defendants did not offer an exculpatory
explanation for their arrest.39 But at trial, each defendant testified that he
was framed by a third party.40 The prosecutor then attempted to
impeach the defendants’ credibility on cross-examination by asking
each defendant why he had not told the “frameup story” to the arresting
officer.41 Although the Court did not address the issue under the Fifth
Amendment, it held that the prosecutor’s use of their post-arrest, postcustody”). See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. Accordingly, post-custody silence may occur before,
during, and after arrest. See Benjamin Berkley, Demeanor Evidence Does Not Demean
Anything: How Exposure to Mass Media Provides a Solution to the Question of Whether
Demeanor Evidence Should Be Admissible as Substantive Evidence of Guilt Post-Arrest and
Pre-Miranda, 42 SW. L. REV. 481, 483–85 (2013) (noting that, under Miranda, the right to
remain silent is triggered once a suspect is in custody, whether or not the suspect has been
placed under arrest).
34. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467–68 (holding that a suspect in custody who is subjected
to interrogation must be informed of the right to remain silent in unequivocal terms); infra note
70 and accompanying text.
35. Berkley, supra note 33, at 483–85 (citing United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 385
(D.C. Cir. 1997)) (arguing that “custody and not interrogation [i]s the trigger for the attachment
of the Fifth Amendment”); Meaghan Elizabeth Ryan, Commentary, Do You Have the Right to
Remain Silent?: The Substantive Use of Pre-Miranda Silence, 58 ALA. L. REV. 903, 913–16
(2007).
36. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 468 n.37 (emphasis added).
37. 426 U.S. 610, 612, 616 (1976).
38. Id. at 611.
39. See id. at 612–13.
40. See id. (“Each petitioner took the stand at his trial and admitted practically everything
about the State’s case except the most crucial point: who was selling the marihuana to whom.”).
41. Id. at 613.
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Miranda silence to impeach the defendants violated the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.42 The Court stated that any
silence that occurs after a suspect has been given Miranda warnings is
“insolubly ambiguous” and thus not very probative.43 In addition, the
Court stated that the Miranda warnings implicitly assure those who
receive the warnings that their silence will not carry a penalty.44 As a
result, once Miranda warnings have been given, “it would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the
arrested person’s silence to be used to impeach an explanation
subsequently offered at trial.”45
Next, in Jenkins v. Anderson, a prosecutor similarly used silence to
impeach the defendant at trial.46 However, because the defendant had
not received Miranda warnings when he was silent, the Court came to
the opposite conclusion.47 In regard to due process, the Court held that
the defendant’s pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence was admissible to
impeach the defendant because the government had not induced him to
remain silent by administering Miranda warnings.48 As a result, the
“fundamental unfairness” present in Doyle was not present in Jenkins.49
The Court also held that using pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence to
impeach the defendant did not violate the Fifth Amendment because
individuals waive some of their protection by voluntarily choosing to
testify.50 Thus, pursuant to Jenkins, a prosecutor does not violate due
process or the Fifth Amendment by using pre-custody, pre-Miranda
silence for impeachment.51
42. Id. at 619.
43. See id. at 617 (“Silence in the wake of these warnings may be nothing more than the
arrestee’s exercise of these Miranda rights.”). One term earlier, the Court decided United States
v. Hale, which held that pre-custody, post-Miranda silence was inadmissible to impeach under
the Federal Rules of Evidence because silence after receipt of Miranda warnings is not very
probative of a defendant’s credibility and also has a significant potential for unfair prejudice.
422 U.S. 171, 180 (1975).
44. Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
45. Id. But cf. Anderson v. Charles, 447 U.S. 404, 408–09 (1980) (declining to extend
Doyle to situations where a defendant has waived his Miranda rights and has given a postcustody statement that was factually inconsistent with his testimony at trial).
46. 447 U.S. 231, 233–34 (1980). In Jenkins, the prosecutor, on cross-examination,
questioned the petitioner about his pre-arrest failure to report a stabbing, and again referenced
the petitioner’s “prearrest silence” during closing argument. Id.
47. See id. at 240.
48. Id. (“In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before
arrest. The failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and given
Miranda warnings.”).
49. Id.
50. See id. at 238 (“[I]mpeachment follows the defendant’s own decision to cast aside his
cloak of silence and advances the truth-finding function of the criminal trial.”).
51. Id. at 238, 240. The Court in Fletcher v. Weir relied on Jenkins and subsequently held
that post-custody, pre-Miranda silence was also admissible to impeach. See Fletcher v. Weir,
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In subsequent decisions, the Supreme Court addressed whether the
Jenkins and Doyle framework governed situations where the prosecutor
used the defendant’s silence as substantive evidence, rather than to
impeach. This added a new dimension to the legal framework. In
contrast to when silence is used for impeachment, the defendant does
not necessarily testify when silence is used as substantive evidence.52
Furthermore, the silence is not used to attack the defendant’s credibility.
Instead, it is used as actual evidence—most often to prove that the
defendant is guilty as charged by suggesting consciousness of guilt.53
For example, in Wainwright v. Greenfield, the defendant entered a
plea of not guilty by reason of insanity to a sexual battery charge.54 At
trial, the prosecutor used the defendant’s invocation of the right to
remain silent and requests to consult with counsel as evidence that the
defendant was, in fact, sane.55 During his closing argument, the
prosecutor suggested that the defendant’s repeated refusals to speak
with police without counsel present demonstrated that the defendant
possessed “a degree of comprehension that was inconsistent with his
claim of insanity.”56 The jury found the defendant guilty, and the judge
sentenced him to life imprisonment.57
Even though the prosecutor in Wainwright used the defendant’s
silence for an entirely different purpose than the prosecutor in Doyle,58
the decision in Wainwright once again turned on whether Miranda
warnings had been read at the time of the silence.59 The Court held that
the admission of the defendant’s post-custody, post-Miranda silence as

455 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1982) (per curiam). The Court again reasoned that the implicit assurance
in the Miranda warnings that silence would not be used adversely is not present for post-arrest,
pre-Miranda silence and therefore due process was not violated. See id.; cf. Jenkins, 447 U.S. at
240. The fact that the suspect was in custody when silent, unlike in Jenkins, was apparently
immaterial to the due process analysis. See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 606–07. Moreover, the Court
did not address any Fifth Amendment concerns. See id.
52. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Greenfield, 474 U.S. 284, 287 (1986); see also Marcy
Strauss, Silence, 35 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 101, 159–61 (2001) (discussing the distinctions between
the admission of silence for impeachment purposes and the introduction of silence as evidence
of guilt).
53. See Strauss, supra note 52, at 102 n.5 (“[S]ilence may be introduced in the case-inchief, as evidence of guilt.”).
54. 474 U.S. at 285.
55. Id. at 285, 287.
56. Id. at 287.
57. Id.
58. Compare Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976) (using the defendant’s silence for
impeachment), with Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 285 (using the defendant’s silence as evidence of
sanity).
59. See Wainwright, 474 U.S. at 295 (relying on the fundamental unfairness of using postMiranda silence against the defendant).
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substantive evidence of guilt violated the Due Process Clause,60
reasoning that, because the police had given Miranda warnings to the
defendant, the implicit assurance that any silence thereafter would not
be used against him was present, and therefore, it was a violation of due
process for the prosecutor to break that promise to the defendant.61
Unfortunately, the Court did not specifically address any Fifth
Amendment concerns, or whether the distinction between purposes of
use was material to the Court’s analysis. Consequently, it was unclear if
the analysis would change under a different set of facts. Nevertheless,
after Wainwright, it was clear that whether the defendant received
Miranda warnings prior to his silence was extremely significant in
almost all circumstances. If the defendant received Miranda warnings,
any silence thereafter was inadmissible both to impeach and as
substantive evidence because it is “fundamentally unfair” to use a
suspect’s silence against him after the police explicitly informed the
suspect that he had the right to remain silent.62 If the defendant did not
receive Miranda warnings, however, there was no issue of fundamental
unfairness, and any silence was admissible to impeach.63 Nonetheless,
the Court had not yet addressed the admissibility of pre-Miranda silence
as substantive evidence.
Then came Salinas v. Texas.64 In Salinas, the plurality held that the
petitioner’s pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence was admissible as
substantive evidence of guilt under the Fifth Amendment because the
petitioner did not invoke his right to remain silent.65 In short, since he
was not in custody and did not meet any other exception to the
invocation requirement,66 he was required to invoke the privilege

60. Id. (holding that the evidentiary use of an individual’s post-arrest, post-Miranda
silence was fundamentally unfair).
61. See id.
62. See id.; Doyle, 426 U.S. at 618.
63. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1982) (per curiam) (finding no violation
of due process where the government did not induce the defendant’s post-custody silence
through the imposition of Miranda warnings); Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980)
(“In this case, no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before arrest. The
failure to speak occurred before the petitioner was taken into custody and given Miranda
warnings. Consequently, the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle is not present in this
case.”).
64. 133 S. Ct. 2174 (2013).
65. Id. at 2180. Justices Antonin Scalia and Clarence Thomas concurred in the judgment,
and argued that even if the petitioner had invoked the privilege, his claim would fail because the
prosecutor’s comments regarding his pre-custody silence did not compel him to give selfincriminating testimony. See id. at 2184 (Thomas, J., concurring).
66. Id. at 2180 (majority opinion). The Court explicitly declined to make an additional
exception to the invocation requirement “for cases in which a witness stands mute and thereby
declines to give an answer that officials suspect would be incriminating.” Id. at 2180–81.
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against self-incrimination in order to claim its protection.67 Because he
did not invoke the privilege through his silence or otherwise, his silence
was admissible against him as evidence of his guilt.68
Salinas is significant to the legal framework governing the
admissibility of silence evidence because the Court’s holding
demonstrates that pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence is admissible as
substantive evidence of guilt unless the suspect has previously invoked
the right to remain silent.69 In addition, for the first time since Miranda,
the Court did not focus its analysis of the admissibility of silence
evidence on Miranda warnings. Instead, custody was more relevant to
its analysis. In fact, both the plurality and the dissent agreed that if the
petitioner was in custody, he would not have been required to invoke his
right to remain silent to have claimed its protection.70
Salinas also shows that if the petitioner received Miranda warnings
prior to his silence, his silence would have been inadmissible as
substantive evidence of guilt.71 Notwithstanding the difference between
using silence for impeachment and using silence as evidence of guilt,
Doyle and its progeny implied that using post-Miranda silence for any
purpose would be inadmissible under the Due Process Clause for
reasons of fundamental unfairness.72 The Court confirmed this in
footnote three of the Salinas opinion, where it explained in one sentence
that under the paradigm set forth by Doyle, due process prohibits
prosecutors from using pre-custody, post-Miranda silence against the
defendant.73 Thus, pursuant to Doyle and now Salinas, it is a violation
67. See id. at 2178–84 (holding that the petitioner’s failure to expressly invoke the
privilege against self-incrimination precluded a finding that the prosecution’s use of
noncustodial silence violated the Fifth Amendment). Explaining that most Americans are aware
that they have a constitutional right to remain silent when being interrogated by the police, the
dissent would have held that the petitioner need not have expressly invoked the protection of the
Fifth Amendment because the circumstances gave rise to a “reasonable inference that [the
petitioner’s] silence derived from an exercise of his Fifth Amendment rights.” See id. at 2189–
90 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
68. Id. at 2178 (majority opinion).
69. See id. at 2178, 2180.
70. Compare id. at 2180 (“[I]n Miranda, we said that a suspect who is subjected to the
‘inherently compelling pressures’ of an unwarned custodial interrogation need not invoke the
privilege.” (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1996))), with id. at 2188 (Breyer,
J., dissenting) (“The Court . . . has made clear that an individual, when silent, need not expressly
invoke the Fifth Amendment if there are ‘inherently compelling pressures’ not to do so.”
(quoting Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467)).
71. See id. at 2182 n.3 (noting that the Due Process Clause prohibits the prosecution from
“pointing to the fact that a defendant was silent after he heard Miranda warnings”).
72. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
73. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3. However, the Court distinguished the Salinas case
from Doyle, reasoning that the rule set forth in Doyle “does not apply where a suspect has not
received the warnings’ implicit promise that any silence will not be used against him.” See id.
(citing Jenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980)).
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of due process for a prosecutor to use pre-custody, post-Miranda silence
at trial, whether the use is for substantive evidence of guilt or for
impeachment.74
The Court, however, did not specifically address how the analysis
would change if the petitioner was in custody but had not yet received
Miranda warnings. It held only that because the petitioner was not in
custody, he was required to invoke the privilege or else his silence could
be used against him.75 Today, this is the only missing piece to the
Supreme Court’s legal framework governing the admissibility of silence
evidence, and there is currently a division of authority among federal
circuit courts on this issue.76 The split among the circuit courts is
primarily predicated on a disagreement over whether administering
Miranda warnings must trigger the right to remain silent, and whether a
constitutional distinction between the use of silence evidence for
impeachment and its use as evidence of guilt actually exists.77
The Fourth,78 Fifth,79 Eighth,80 and Eleventh81 Circuits have all held
that post-custody, pre-Miranda silence is admissible as evidence of
guilt. Most of these circuits understandably found Miranda warnings to
74. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 619 (1976); Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3.
75. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180–84; Totten, supra note 5, at 1514 (noting Salinas, 133
S. Ct. at 2182 n.3).
76. Berkley, supra note 33, at 485. For a chart summarizing the Supreme Court’s rules
governing the admissibility of silence evidence after Salinas, see Appendix infra.
77. Berkley, supra note 33, at 485–86.
78. See United States v. Love, 767 F.2d 1052, 1063 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that silence
evidence was admissible to prove guilt because the defendants were not given Miranda
warnings); Folston v. Allsbrook, 691 F.2d 184, 187 (4th Cir. 1982) (holding that silence
evidence was admissible to prove guilt where the record was unclear as to whether the
defendant received Miranda warnings, and where the defendant was not under interrogation by
any police officer at the time of silence).
79. See United States v. Salinas, 480 F.3d 750, 755–59 (5th Cir. 2007) (holding that,
pursuant to Doyle, the prosecution’s reference to the defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence in its case-in-chief did not violate due process, but declining to answer “whether a
prosecutor’s use of a defendant’s post-arrest, pre-Miranda silence as substantive evidence of
guilt violates the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination”); United States v.
Garcia-Gil, 133 F. App’x 102, 108 (5th Cir. 2005) (holding that the defendant’s post-arrest, preMiranda silence was admissible in the prosecution’s case-in-chief); United States v. Musquiz,
45 F.3d 927, 931 (5th Cir. 1995) (holding that the admissibility of post-arrest, pre-Miranda
silence evidence to prove guilt “turns on fact specific weighing by the judge”).
80. See United States v. Osuna-Zepeda, 416 F.3d 838, 844 (8th Cir. 2005) (reiterating its
prior holding that “the use of postarrest, pre-Miranda silence in a prosecution’s case-in-chief
was not unconstitutional”); United States v. Frazier, 408 F.3d 1102, 1111 (8th Cir. 2005)
(holding that “the use of Frazier’s silence in the government’s case-in-chief as evidence of guilt
did not violate his Fifth Amendment rights” because “he was under no government-imposed
compulsion to speak”).
81. See United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 1568 (11th Cir. 1991) (“The government
may comment on a defendant’s silence if it occurred prior to the time that he is arrested and
given his Miranda warnings.”).
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be a dispositive factor.82 Relying mainly on Doyle, Fletcher, and
Jenkins, these circuits reasoned that, because the suspect did not receive
Miranda warnings, there was no violation of the Due Process Clause or
the Fifth Amendment in allowing the jury to infer guilt from the postcustody silence.83 Accordingly, these circuits did not find custody to be
a dispositive factor, nor did they find a constitutional distinction
between the two purposes of use.84
In contrast, the Second,85 Seventh,86 Ninth,87 and District of
Colombia88 Circuits have all held that post-custody, pre-Miranda
silence is inadmissible as evidence of guilt under the Fifth Amendment.
Explaining that the right to remain silent derives from the Constitution,
not from Miranda warnings themselves, most of these circuits found
custody to be a dispositive factor.89 Whereas custody is known as the
triggering mechanism for Fifth Amendment protection,90 Miranda
warnings are merely prophylactic rules created by the Court in the
1960s to protect the privilege against self-incrimination.91 Thus, unlike
82. See, e.g., Salinas, 480 F.3d at 757–58; Rivera, 944 F.2d at 1568; Love, 767 F.2d at
1063. But see, e.g., Frazier, 408 F.3d at 1111 (retreating from its prior position that Miranda
warnings are determinative, and finding that “the more precise issue is whether [the defendant]
was under any compulsion to speak at the time of his silence”).
83. Berkley, supra note 33, at 490; Marty Skrapka, Comment, Silence Should Be Golden:
A Case Against the Use of a Defendant’s Post-Arrest, Pre-Miranda Silence as Evidence of Guilt,
59 OKLA. L. REV. 357, 378 & n.161 (2006); see, e.g., supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
84. See sources cited supra note 83.
85. See United States v. Flecha, 539 F.2d 874, 877 (2d Cir. 1976) (noting that “many
arrested persons know, without benefit of warnings, that silence is usually golden”).
86. See United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987)
(holding that the defendant has a “constitutional right to say nothing at all,” and that using
silence as proof of guilt is prohibited, even in the absence of Miranda warnings); see also
United States v. Hernandez, 948 F.2d 316, 322 (7th Cir. 1991) (noting Seventh Circuit
precedent barring the defendant’s refusal to talk to the police as evidence of guilt); United States
v. Ramos, 932 F.2d 611, 616 (7th Cir. 1991) (same).
87. See United States v. Bushyhead, 270 F.3d 905, 912–13 (9th Cir. 2001) (“The privilege
against self-incrimination prevents the government’s use at trial of evidence of a defendant’s
silence-not merely the silence itself, but the circumstances of that silence as well.”); United
States v. Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d 1023, 1028–33 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the district
court erred by “allowing the government to comment” on the defendant’s post-arrest, preMiranda silence); United States v. Whitehead, 200 F.3d 634, 639 (9th Cir. 2000) (same); Guam
v. Veloria, 136 F.3d 648, 652–53 (9th Cir. 1998) (finding that the prosecutor’s reference to the
defendant’s silence was prejudicial and contrary to “clearly announced rules of constitutional
protection”).
88. See United States v. Moore, 104 F.3d 377, 389 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (“[T]he law is plain
that the prosecution cannot, consistent with the Constitution, use a defendant’s silence against
him as evidence of his guilt.”).
89. See, e.g., Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1029; Moore, 104 F.3d at 389.
90. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
91. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 617 (1976) (describing the Miranda warnings as
“prophylactic means of safeguarding Fifth Amendment rights”); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S.
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the protection of the Due Process Clause, the Fifth Amendment’s
protection arises once the government places an individual into custody,
irrespective of whether the government administers Miranda warnings
to the individual.92 Some of these circuits also argue that there is a
constitutional difference between using silence to impeach and using
silence as evidence of guilt.93 Consequently, any reliance on Doyle,
Fletcher, and Jenkins in this regard is misplaced because those cases
only spoke to the admissibility of pre-custody silence evidence to
impeach.94
Although the Salinas Court seemingly “balked” by not explicitly
resolving the question presented,95 it did shed light on the current circuit
split. Similar to the Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, the
Court could have come to the same conclusion in Salinas—that the
petitioner’s pre-custody, pre-Miranda silence was admissible as
substantive evidence—based solely on the fact that the petitioner did
not receive Miranda warnings, and its decision would have been
arguably supported by precedent.96 But by shifting the primary focus
away from Miranda warnings and towards custody, like the Second,
Seventh, Ninth, and District of Colombia Circuits, Salinas implied that
it would be deficient and problematic to use Miranda warnings as the
dispositive factor for determining the admissibility of silence as
evidence of guilt under the Fifth Amendment.97 For example, in Salinas,
the Court relied on Jenkins to explain that, because the petitioner was
not given Miranda warnings, there was no issue of fundamental
unfairness and thus no violation of due process.98 However, it would
433, 444, 446 (1974) (noting that Miranda warnings are “procedural safeguards” that are “not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution,” but rather “prophylactic standards” laid down
by the Court in Miranda).
92. See Velarde-Gomez, 269 F.3d at 1029.
93. See, e.g., Moore, 104 F.3d at 386 (distinguishing between the application of Doyle’s
due process analysis for the use of silence evidence to impeach and the use of silence evidence
to prove guilt); United States ex rel. Savory v. Lane, 832 F.2d 1011, 1017–18 (7th Cir. 1987);
accord Skrapka, supra note 83, at 401–02 (arguing that there is a distinction between using
silence evidence to prove guilt and to impeach; namely, the former is protected by enumerated
principles in the Bill of Rights “that prevent its use as substantive evidence of guilt”).
94. See Fletcher v. Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 606–07 (1982) (per curiam); Jenkins v. Anderson,
447 U.S. 231, 238 (1980); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 611 (1976).
95. See Salinas v. Texas, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 2179 (2013); Totten, supra note 5, at 1504.
96. See supra notes 78–84 and accompanying text. For example, in Jenkins and Fletcher,
the Court previously indicated that, whether or not the suspect was in custody, pre-Miranda
silence was admissible to impeach because there was no governmental action inducing the
petitioner to remain silent. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 240; accord Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607.
Similarly, in Salinas, the Court could have said that the petitioner’s silence was admissible as
evidence of guilt because the petitioner did not receive Miranda warnings and, thus, was not
induced by governmental action to remain silent. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2177–78.
97. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180; supra notes 85–94 and accompanying text.
98. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3.
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have been illogical and untenable for the Court to say that, because
there was no issue of fundamental unfairness, the petitioner’s silence
was also admissible under the Fifth Amendment. Just because there is
no issue of fundamental unfairness, which is the core concern of due
process, does not mean that there is no issue of compulsion to selfincriminate, the core concern of the Fifth Amendment’s privilege
against self-incrimination.99 In other words, although Miranda warnings
are highly relevant to a due process analysis, in isolation, they provide
little guidance when determining the admissibility of silence under the
Fifth Amendment.100
Custody, in contrast, makes more sense as the primary factor for
determining the admissibility of silence evidence under the Fifth
Amendment.101 Due to the ubiquitous coverage of our criminal justice
system in the media today, most Americans are aware of their right to
remain silent, even when Miranda warnings have not been read.102 As a
result, placing a suspect into custody to conduct a criminal investigation
may actually “compel” the suspect to remain silent out of fear that
anything he says may be used against him in a court of law.103 In
addition, despite the fact that most Americans are not aware of the
“technical legal requirements” to invoke their right,104 in Salinas, the
Court reiterated that the Fifth Amendment automatically protects a
suspect who remains silent in the face of unwarned custodial
interrogation because a suspect is not required to invoke the privilege
against self-incrimination under such circumstances.105 Furthermore,
99. See State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 770 (Fla. 1998) (“While the absence of Miranda
warnings may prevent a federal due process violation from occurring where the defendant’s
post-arrest silence is used for impeachment purposes, the same is not true of the defendant’s
right to remain silent.”).
100. See Ryan, supra note 35, at 913–16 (“The purpose of the Miranda warnings is not to
trigger the right itself but only to inform the defendant that he has such a right.”); Hoggins, 718
So. 2d at 770 (“The United States Supreme Court’s decision finding post-Miranda silence
violative of the federal constitution is based primarily on due process principles.”). In this
regard, Miranda warnings are perhaps more appropriately understood as the triggering
mechanism for supplemental due process protection during interrogation by law enforcement.
See id.
101. See Berkley, supra note 33, at 499; Ryan, supra note 35, at 913–16.
102. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2189–90 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citations omitted);
Skrapka, supra note 83, at 358 (“Most Americans have heard [Miranda] warnings recited
countless times on television shows like Dragnet, Hawaii Five-O, Law and Order, and The
Wire.”); supra note 85.
103. See Skrapka, supra note 83, at 358–59 (“If most people are at least generally aware of
their right to remain silent, it follows that a reasonable person who is aware of this right might
naturally exercise the right when faced with arrest, even before the express warning is given.”).
104. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2190 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
105. See id. at 2180 (noting that a suspect who is subjected to unwarned custodial
interrogation is excused from failing to invoke the privilege because “governmental coercion
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although silence does not invoke the right to remain silent,106 silence
has never been thought to waive that right.107 Thus, to later use such
self-incriminating silence against the suspect to suggest consciousness
of guilt would raise serious Fifth Amendment concerns.108 As a
practical matter, allowing the use of silence under such circumstances
may “compel” the defendant to testify at trial, thereby permitting
impeachment,109 and may create an incentive for law enforcement to
delay giving Miranda warnings, for example.110
But even if custody is the primary consideration for determining the
admissibility of silence under the Fifth Amendment, Miranda warnings
and the distinction between purposes of use would still be important
factors. For example, even if post-custody, pre-Miranda silence is
inadmissible as evidence of guilt, the same silence may be admissible to
impeach because Miranda warnings have not been given, and because
the defendant has voluntarily chosen to waive some of the Fifth
Amendment’s protection by testifying.111 But if Miranda warnings were
given, the silence would also be inadmissible to impeach for reasons of
fundamental unfairness.112 Consequently, both Miranda warnings and
the purpose of use are still important considerations to determining the
admissibility of silence in general.
In conclusion, this Comment argues that post-custody, pre-Miranda
silence should be inadmissible as substantive evidence of guilt under the
Fifth Amendment. In addition, this Comment proposes a simple set of
makes [the suspect’s] forfeiture of the privilege involuntary”); supra notes 29–32, 35 and
accompanying text.
106. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182.
107. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475 (1966) (“[A] valid waiver will not be
presumed simply from the silence of the accused after warnings are given . . . .”).
108. See Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“To permit a prosecutor to
comment on a defendant’s constitutionally protected silence would put that defendant in an
impossible predicament. He must either answer the question or remain silent. If he answers the
question, he may well reveal, for example, prejudicial facts, disreputable associates, or
suspicious circumstances—even if he is innocent. If he remains silent, the prosecutor may well
use that silence to suggest a consciousness of guilt.” (citation omitted)); Berkley, supra note 33,
at 498–500; Skrapka, supra note 83, at 396–402.
109. See Totten, supra note 5, at 1512; Skrapka, supra note 83, at 397; Salinas, 133 S. Ct.
at 2186 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the defendant then takes the witness stand in order to
explain either his speech or his silence, the prosecution may introduce, say for impeachment
purposes, a prior conviction that the law would otherwise make inadmissible.”); Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603, 607 (1982) (per curiam) (allowing the use of post-custody, pre-Miranda
silence to impeach the defendant at trial).
110. See State v. Hoggins, 718 So. 2d 761, 770 (Fla. 1998) (noting that by “relying on the
right to remain silent to preclude evidence of and comment upon postarrest silence,” the police
will not have an incentive to delay administering Miranda warnings); Skrapka, supra note 83, at
400–01.
111. See Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607.
112. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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rules that distinguishes between the two purposes of use in determining
the constitutional admissibility of all silence evidence. Not only does
this set of rules coincide with all of the Court’s precedents, including
Salinas, it would resolve the current circuit split and complete the legal
framework governing the admissibility of silence evidence today.
The first set of rules addresses the admissibility of silence as
substantive evidence of guilt. If the suspect was given Miranda
warnings, was in custody, or had otherwise invoked the privilege
against self-incrimination, the suspect’s silence is inadmissible as
evidence of guilt.113 But if the suspect was not given Miranda warnings,
was not in custody, and failed to invoke the privilege, as in Salinas, the
suspect’s silence is admissible as evidence of guilt.114 The second set of
rules addresses the admissibility of silence for the purpose of
impeachment. Regardless of if the suspect was in custody, if Miranda
warnings were not given, the suspect’s silence is admissible to impeach
the suspect if he or she chooses to testify.115 However, if Miranda
warnings were given, the suspect’s silence is inadmissible to impeach
the suspect for reasons of fundamental unfairness.116 Having a clear set
of rules within this complex, unsettled area of law will help to provide
predictability and uniformity in future cases involving one of our most
fundamental rights: the right to remain silent.
113. If the suspect has received Miranda warnings, the use of silence to prove guilt would
be a violation of due process. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2182 n.3 (noting that the use of pre-custody,
post-Miranda silence as substantive evidence violates due process); Wainwright v. Greenfield,
474 U.S. 284, 295 (1986) (holding that the prosecutor’s use of the defendant’s post-arrest, postMiranda silence as substantive evidence was fundamentally unfair). Assuming there is
interrogation, if the suspect was in custody and Miranda warnings were not given, or if the
suspect had otherwise invoked his right to remain silent, the use of silence to prove guilt would
be a violation of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. See Berghuis v.
Thompkins, 130 S. Ct. 2250, 2259 (2010) (“The Miranda Court formulated a warning that must
be given to suspects before they can be subjected to custodial interrogation.”); supra notes 29–
32, 70 and accompanying text; Michigan v. Mosely, 423 U.S. 96, 103–04 (1975) (stating that by
exercising the right to remain silent, a defendant can be ensured that the police will terminate
their interrogation and concomitantly respect the suspect’s exercise of that right).
114. Salinas, 133 S. Ct. at 2180.
115. Fletcher, 455 U.S. at 607 (holding that the prosecutor’s use of post-custody, preMiranda silence to impeach the defendant at trial did not violate due process); Jenkins v.
Anderson, 447 U.S. 231, 240 (1980) (holding that “the fundamental unfairness present in Doyle
[wa]s not present” where “no governmental action induced petitioner to remain silent before
arrest”).
116. Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610, 618 (1976) (“[W]hile it is true that the Miranda
warnings contain no express assurance that silence will carry no penalty, such assurance is
implicit to any person who receives the warnings. In such circumstances, it would be
fundamentally unfair and a deprivation of due process to allow the arrested person’s silence to
be used to impeach an explanation subsequently offered at trial.”); cf. United States v. Hale, 422
U.S. 171, 180–81 (1975) (holding that a defendant’s silence during police interrogation lacks
significant probative value and is “intolerably” prejudicial).
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Appendix
IN CUSTODY

MIRANDA
WARNINGS
GIVEN

MIRANDA
WARNINGS
NOT
GIVEN
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NOT IN CUSTODY

¾Silence is inadmissible to
impeach (Doyle).

¾Silence is inadmissible to
impeach (Doyle).

¾Silence is inadmissible to
prove guilt (Wainwright).

¾Silence is inadmissible to
prove guilt (Salinas).

¾Silence is admissible to
impeach (Fletcher).

¾Silence is admissible to
impeach (Jenkins).

¾There is a split among federal
circuit courts over whether
silence is admissible to prove
guilt.

¾Silence is admissible to prove
guilt unless the suspect has
previously invoked the
privilege against selfincrimination (Salinas).
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